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I. INTRODUCTION
The question has long been asked, “How far, if at all, is one
man bound, being able to do so without serious inconvenience to
himself, to go out of his way to care for those injured without any
1
fault of his?” “The problem of rescue is a central issue in the
† J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. Colorado
College, magna cum laude, 1998.
1. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability,
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controversy about the relationship between law and morality.” As
quoted nearly a century ago, “[f]eelings of kindness and sympathy
may move the Good Samaritan to minister to the sick and wounded
at the roadside, but the law imposes no such obligation; and
suffering humanity has no legal complaint against those who pass
3
by on the other side.”
A Good Samaritan generally acts out of the kindness of his
4
heart, and historically the law hesitates to impose such an
5
obligation on individuals. Minnesota, however, has gone against
the grain and created a statutory duty to render assistance at the
6
The immunity associated with that
scene of an emergency.
statutory duty was challenged in Swenson v. Waseca Mutual Insurance
Co., in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly granted
immunity to a Good Samaritan providing transportation to an
7
injured girl.
This note first explores the history highlighting the difference
8
between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Next, it describes the
historical lack of recognition of a duty to aid another and the
9
liability of volunteers to those they help. Then the note observes
the states’ recognition of the public policy issue of encouraging
individuals to render assistance in emergencies, and the states’
adoption of Good Samaritan laws granting immunity to such
10
volunteers. Next, it describes the elements that Minnesota’s case
11
law has historically required before a duty to assist is recognized,
followed by a description of the imposition of a statutory duty to
12
13
assist. The Swenson case is described next. The note ends with
56 U. PA. L. REV., 217, 217 (1908)).
2. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 293
(1980).
3. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) (quoting
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903)).
4. See Luke 10:30-37. The parable tells the story of the Good Samaritan, who
was the only one of three passers-by who came to the aid of a man who was beaten,
robbed, and left by the side of the road. Id. The Good Samaritan took the
downtrodden individual to an inn and paid for his stay there without expecting
anything in return. Id.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
6. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 1 (2002).
7. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.D.1.
12. See infra Part II.D.2.
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an analysis of the Swenson decision, including an alternative
method of resolving the case and supporting law from other
14
states.
II. HISTORY
A. Misfeasance and Nonfeasance
Early writers noted that “[t]here is no distinction more deeply
rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that
15
between misfeasance and non-feasance.” Misfeasance differs from
nonfeasance in form of conduct: misfeasance is “active misconduct
working positive injury to others” while nonfeasance is “a failure to
16
take positive steps to benefit others.”
The victim is clearly worse off due to the wrongful act in cases
17
of active misfeasance. “In cases of passive inaction [the] plaintiff
is . . . no worse off at all . . . . [H]e is merely deprived of a
protection which, had it been afforded him, would have benefited
18
him.” The defendant has left him just as he was, neither better off
19
nor in no worse condition. It is a loss only in the sense that the
20
plaintiff was not given something.
To help clarify the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, the suggestion is to focus not on the moment the
defendant failed to act to prevent harm to the plaintiff, but at the
21
course of events prior to that moment. If there is no significant
interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant prior to that
moment, the defendant’s conduct can be considered to be
22
nonfeasance. Participation by the defendant in the creation of
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. Bohlen, supra note 1, at 219. “This distinction is founded on that attitude
of extreme individualism so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought.” Id. at 220. “The
primary conception of the common law was that which regarded the individual as
competent to protect himself if not interfered with from without.” Id. at 221.
16. Id. at 219.
17. Id. at 220.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 221. Other writers have elaborated on those earlier notions. See
generally Weinrib, supra note 2, at 251-58 (elaborating on Professor Bohlen’s
theories).
21. Weinrib, supra note 2, at 253.
22. Id. at 253-54. Professor Weinrib gives the example of two different
scenarios: a car driver not pressing the brake and striking a pedestrian, and a pool
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the risk is thus the crucial factor in distinguishing misfeasance from
23
nonfeasance.
B. The Duty to Protect or Aid Others
1. No Duty to Aid, No Liability for Harm
Generally, there is no duty to protect or come to the aid of
24
another in peril. “The fact that the actor realizes or should realize
that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection
25
does not of itself impose upon him to take such action.” No duty
exists even if the danger to the other is great and the trouble of
26
aiding him is minimal. “Those duties which are dictated merely
by good morals or by humane considerations are not within the
27
domain of the law.” The argument in favor of recognizing moral
obligations as valid legal claims was rejected by courts on the
grounds that such recognition would destabilize written law by
28
replacing it with the varied morals of those sitting on the bench.
A duty to protect or aid another may exist if the parties

patron not throwing a rope to a drowning person. Id. at 253. Looking only at the
moment of injury, both situations pose instances of nonfeasance; the driver failed
to press the brake, and the observer failed to throw a rope. Id. Looking to the
events leading up to the injury, however, the driver created the conditions resulting
in injury, while the pool patron did nothing to cause the drowning. Id. With this
analysis, Professor Weinrib suggests that the car driver is guilty of misfeasance
while the pool patron’s conduct is nonfeasance. Id.; see also Newton v. Ellis, 119
Eng. Rep. 424 (K.B. 1855) (holding that one who dug a hole near a road and
failed to light it at night was guilty of misfeasance because the inaction (failure to
light the hole) was preceded by an act (digging the hole)).
23. Weinrib, supra note 2, at 256.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
25. Id. Courts in the early 1900s recognized this rule and were hesitant to
change moral obligations into legal duties. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72
P. 281, 282 (Kan. 1903) (“For withholding relief from the suffering, for failure to
respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment of
brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in the laws of men, but
in that higher law . . . .”).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965). The rule
applies “irrespective of the gravity of the danger to which the other is subjected
and the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or expense of giving him aid or
protection.” Id. See also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 114 (2003) (explaining the
rules of assisting others).
27. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) (citing Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903)).
28. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903).
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29

involved have a special relationship.
Four primary special
relationships are recognized: that between a common carrier and a
passenger, between an innkeeper and a guest, between a
landowner and those upon his land by his invitation, and between
one who takes custody of another either voluntarily or as required
30
by law.
The duty to protect another in a special relationship arises
only when the relationship exists and the harm develops in the
31
course of that relationship. However, absent a special relationship
or the termination of an existing special relationship, a party is
32
“Unless a relation
under no duty to protect or aid the other.
exists between the sick . . . and those who witness their distress
[requiring them to provide] the necessary relief, there is neither
legal obligation to minister on the one hand, nor cause for legal
33
complaint on the other.”
2. Recognizing Liability for Harm
Liability for bodily harm to another will be recognized when,
having no prior duty to do so, an actor takes charge of another who
34
is helpless. The actor in such a situation will be subject to liability
for injury to the other when the actor fails to exercise reasonable
care to secure the safety of the imperiled person, or when the actor
discontinues aid or protection and leaves the victim in a worse
35
position.
It would seem, then, that given such potential for
liability if the rescue goes awry, a possible rescuer might rethink his
intent to render assistance at the scene of an emergency.
Legal writers find decisions following the general rule of no
36
duty to aid or protect revolting to moral sense. In fact, at least
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
30. Id.
31. Id. cmt. c.
32. Id. (“A carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased
to be a passenger, nor is an innkeeper under a duty to a guest who is injured or
endangered while he is away from the premises.”).
33. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) (citing Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903)).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
35. Id.
36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56
(5th ed. 1984); see also Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that a
moral, not a legal, duty to aid existed when defendant watched plaintiff
drowning); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112-13 (1908)
(“We should all be better satisfied if the man who refuses to throw a rope to a
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one author believes the law should reflect
37
Consequently, it has been written
obligations.
“such extreme cases of morally outrageous
indefensible conduct will arise that there will be
38
upon the older rule.”

[Vol. 30:3

general moral
that eventually
behavior and
further inroads

C. The Good Samaritan Law
Little evidence exists that documents how frequently
39
individuals assist at scenes of emergencies involving strangers.
However, some authors give reasons to explain the perceived
40
hesitancy of individuals to help in apparent emergencies.
Consequently, Good Samaritan statutes were created for the
purpose of encouraging prompt emergency care by granting
statutory immunity from civil damages and removing the fear of
41
liability.
The statutes are designed to protect individuals from civil
liability for any negligent acts or omissions committed while
42
providing emergency care. Such statutes attempt to eliminate the
perceived inadequacies of the common-law rule under which a
volunteer, assisting an injured person with no prior duty to do so,
was liable for failing to exercise reasonable care in providing the
drowning man or to save a helpless child on the railroad track could be punished
and be made to compensate [those who are injured] . . . [I]t is hard to see why
such a rule should not be declared by statute, if not by the courts.”); Charles O.
Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, 23, 27 (James Ratcliffe ed., 1981) [hereinafter
SAMARITAN] (characterizing a court decision holding motorists involved in a crash
liable for not warning others of the blocked road as a “childishly simple” advance
over the general common law duty); Weinrib, supra note 2, at 247.
37. See Antony M. Honoré, Law, Morals and Rescue, in SAMARITAN, supra note
36, at 225, 238-39 (recognizing the advantage to those who would benefit from
such a rule, and stating that such a change would correct the layman’s feeling that
the law is “like an overpermissive father . . . set[ting] its standard too low”).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965).
39. Lawrence Z. Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help, in SAMARITAN, supra
note 36, at 171; Joseph Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans, in
SAMARITAN, supra note 36, at 183, 185.
40. See Herbert Fingarette, Some Moral Aspects of Good Samaritanship, in
SAMARITAN, supra note 36, at 213, 213-14 (describing how people might not
interfere in strangers’ affairs out of fear of being wrong in their assessment of the
situation); Freedman, supra note 39, at 171, 176-181 (pointing to apprehension,
acquiescence, and aggression as reasons that people do not get involved).
41. Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good
Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294, 299-300 (1989).
42. Id.
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43

assistance. In fact, some state legislatures clearly state that the
intent in creating such a statute is to encourage health care
practitioners, who are not “on the job” at the time, to provide
44
necessary emergency care to all persons without fear of litigation.
45
The first Good Samaritan statute was passed in 1959 in
46
California. Since then, all states have enacted some form of Good
47
Samaritan legislation. Many Good Samaritan statutes require that
the volunteer act in good faith in order to be eligible for immunity;
the rescuer must not have received anything for his efforts or
48
participated with the expectation of receiving any benefit. This
requirement is consistent with the definition of a “Good
49
Samaritan.”

43. Id.; see supra Part II.B.2.
44. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13(2)(c)(3) (West 2003).
45. Veilleux, supra note 41.
46. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1507 (currently codified as amended at CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 2003)).
47. Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A
Current Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 303 (1983); see ALA. CODE § 6-5-332 (2003);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090 (Michie 2002) (amended 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 362263 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101 (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21108 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557b (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801
(2002); FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2003); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 663-1.5 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (2003); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
49/1-75 (2003); IND. CODE § 34-30-12-1 (West 2003); IOWA CODE § 613.17 (2002);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891 (2002) (amended 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.148
(2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2793 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 164
(West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-603 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 12B (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1501 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. §
604A.01 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37 (2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.037
(2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,186 (2002);
NEV. REV. STAT. 41.500 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:12 (2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-3 (2003); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 3000-a (2003) (amended 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.14 (2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.1-02 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.23 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit.
76, § 5 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.800 (2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8331 (2003);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-27.1 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-310 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 20-9-4.1 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-218 (2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 74.152 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-22 (2003); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.24.300 (West 2003) (amended 2003); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15 (2003); WIS.
STAT. § 895.48 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-120 (2002) (amended 2003).
48. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-332 (2003) (“gratuitously and in good faith”); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-108 (2003) (“without compensation”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
663-1.5 (2003) (“without remuneration or expectation of remuneration”).
49. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 822 (2d ed. 2001)
(“[A] person who gratuitously gives help or sympathy to those in distress.”); see also
supra note 4.
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Not all Good Samaritan statutes are the same, though; some
provide protection to a narrow class of individuals, while others
50
protect a broader class of people. For example, some states have
chosen to protect only individuals licensed or certified in the
51
medical field. Other states apply the Good Samaritan immunity to
52
a slightly larger group of individuals; still others protect “any
53
person.”
States also differ in the general language and terms used in
54
their Good Samaritan statutes.
While all states protect the
volunteer’s act of rendering assistance, they differ in describing the
55
While some Good Samaritan
scope of the protected conduct.
statutes protect individuals acting in or at the scene of an
56
“emergency,” others protect actions at the scene of an “accident.”
57
Legislatures have tried to
Some statutes include both terms.
58
reduce ambiguity through definition.
Others use neither
50. Veilleux, supra note 41.
51. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12B (2003) (protecting
physicians, physician assistants, and registered or licensed nurses); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 691.1501 sec.1(1) (West 2003) (same).
52. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891(e) (2002) (amended 2003)
(protecting any person licensed to practice in any branch of the healing arts); MO.
REV. STAT. § 537.037(1)-(2) (2002) (protecting licensed physicians and surgeons,
registered or licensed nurses, and any person trained to provide first aid in a
standard recognized training program).
53. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(a) (Michie 2002); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 6801(a) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.300(1) (West 2003).
54. See generally Veilleux, supra note 41.
55. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 5(a)(2) (2002) (protecting volunteer acts of
artificial respiration, restoration of breathing, preventing blood loss, or restoring
heart action or circulation of blood) with MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5603(a) (2003) (protecting persons giving any assistance or medical care)
(emphasis added).
56. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-22(1) (2003) (emergency) with IDAHO
CODE § 5-330 (2003) (accident). It seems “emergency” is a broader term than
“accident.” For example, the Utah legislature’s definition of “emergency”
includes, among other things, “accidents.” See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-22(1)
(2003). The inference may fairly be drawn that while an emergency could involve
an accident, not all accidents are emergencies.
57. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(a) (Michie 2002); GA. CODE ANN. §
51-1-29 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(A)(1) (2003) (scene of an accident, fire,
or any life-threatening emergency); WIS. STAT. § 895.48(1) (2003).
58. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 2003) (defining the scene
of an emergency as including, “but not limited to, the emergency rooms of
hospitals in the event of a medical disaster”); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2(b)
(2002) (defining the scene of emergency as “an area outside the confines of a
hospital or other institution that has hospital facilities”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-1122(1) (2003) (defining emergency as “an unexpected occurrence involving injury,
threat of injury, or illness to a person or the public”).
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“emergency” nor “accident,” opting rather to describe the
characteristics of an imperiled person, thereby implying an
59
emergency situation. A different approach is to specify locations
60
where Good Samaritan immunity will not apply.
The statutes typically define the standard of care the volunteer
61
must exercise to be eligible for immunity, although some simply
protect volunteers from liability resulting from any acts or
62
omissions when rendering assistance. One definition requires the
63
individual to act as a reasonable and prudent person.
Most
statutes immunize volunteers against their ordinary negligence
when assisting a victim, but do not protect against conduct that
64
indicates gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
The most noticeable difference between the general rule
regarding coming to another’s aid and Good Samaritan statutes is
that the general rule defines the liability of one who aids another

59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801(a) (2002) (protecting acts of assistance
given “to a person who is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance,
or any person in obvious physical distress or discomfort”).
60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13(2)(a) (West 2003) (specifying that the
statutory immunity applies to assistance “at the scene of an emergency outside of a
hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical equipment”); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 164 (West 2003) (stating the immunity “shall not apply if
such first aid or emergency treatment or assistance is rendered on the premises of
a hospital or clinic”). Cf. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.090(a) (Michie 2002) (providing
immunity to “a person at a hospital or any other location” who renders assistance).
61. See Veilleux, supra note 41.
62. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §
12B (2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-15 (2003).
63. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.13(2)(a) (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-603(c)(1)
(2003). It may seem peculiar that some states have decided to codify the common
law rule. Further scrutiny of those statutes yields reasonable justifications for the
legislative action. For example, the Florida statute lumps medical professionals
together with all other citizens, so the reasonableness standard seems to operate
primarily to shield medical professionals from liability, encouraging them to assist
at the scene of an emergency. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13(2)(a) (West 2003).
The Arkansas statute holds ordinary citizens to the reasonableness standard, but
restricts their ability to act, most notably by allowing such individuals to provide
only such assistance as is needed. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101(b)(3) (Michie
2002). The Maryland statute operates in much the same way. See MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-603(c)(3) (2003). By granting immunity for the common
law rule, most everyone could claim that immunity. It seems, therefore, that the
states attempted to counteract that imbalance by restricting the types of conduct
for which a person could claim the immunity.
64. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6801(a) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3012-1(b) (West 2003).
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65

without a prior duty to do so, while Good Samaritan statutes
66
protect rescuers from such liability. In addition, the standard of
care imposed on an actor under the general rule is that of
67
reasonable care, while Good Samaritan statutes generally protect
68
even negligent actions. However, some Good Samaritan statutes
diverge from the common law rule in another, more significant
way: they create a statutory duty to render assistance to individuals
69
in danger.
D. Minnesota and the Duty to Aid
1. Common Law History
Minnesota is one of only three states that have created a
70
statutory duty to render assistance to others who are in peril.
Minnesota first tackled the issue of whether one has a duty to
71
In Depue a cattle
render aid or protection in Depue v. Flateau.
72
buyer stopped at a farmer’s house to purchase cattle. While on
the premises, the buyer became quite ill and asked to spend the
73
night, but was refused. After the buyer awakened from a fainting
74
spell, the farmer escorted him to his cutter and sent him off the
75
property. A passer-by found the buyer by the roadside early the
next morning suffering from frostbite and other ailments; he had
become sick on the ride and fallen from his vehicle during the
76
night.
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the
77
action, finding that the farmer may have owed a duty to the buyer.
The court held:
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
66. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2003).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
68. See e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-714(1) (2002).
69. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002).
70. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2003); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002); see generally Gabriel C.M. Ciociola, Misprision of
Felony and Its Progeny, 41 Brandeis L.J. 697, 735-36 (2003).
71. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907).
72. Id. at 301, 111 N.W. at 1.
73. Id. at 301, 111 N.W. at 2.
74. A cutter is “a small, light sleigh, usually single seated and pulled by one
horse.” RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 2001).
75. Depue, 100 Minn. at 301-02, 111 N.W. at 2.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 305, 111 N.W. at 3.
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[W]henever a person is placed in such a position with
regard to another that it is obvious that, if he does not use
due care in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that
person, the duty at once arises to exercise care
commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds
himself, and with which he is confronted, to avoid such
danger; and a negligent failure to perform the duty
78
renders him liable for the consequences of his neglect.
The court further noted that the rule “applies with greater
strictness to conduct towards persons under disability, and imposes
the obligation as a matter of law, not mere sentiment, at least to
refrain from any affirmative action that might result in injury to
79
The rule was focused on the parties having a special
them.”
80
relationship. A crucial aspect of the rule is the actor’s knowledge
81
and appreciation of the imperiled person’s condition. However,
the court stressed the fact that the farmer had no absolute duty to
entertain the buyer, only that the farmer could not make the buyer
82
any worse off.
The Minnesota Supreme Court handled a related situation
83
involving injury and emergency care in the same year as Depue.
Shaw v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. was an action for negligence in
which a conductor missed a train and required a brakeman to go
on top of the train to stop it, which ultimately led to the
84
brakeman’s death. However, the court briefly considered the test
for negligence to be applied in a situation where one renders

78. Id. at 303, 111 N.W. at 2.
79. Id. at 304, 111 N.W. at 3 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 303, 111 N.W. at 2 (stating the principle applies to situations arising
from “noncontract relations,” such as that between a landowner and a trespasser
or invitee, and noting that the buyer was on the farm at the invitation of the
farmer). The court also noted that “[t]hose entering the premises of another by
invitation are entitled to a higher degree of care than those who are present by
mere sufferance.” Id. The special relationship in Depue has been construed as one
where a party controls the circumstances or is in charge of another. See Tiedeman
v. Morgan, 435 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Regan v. Stromberg, 285
N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. 1979).
81. Depue, 100 Minn. at 305, 111 N.W. at 3 (“If defendants knew and
appreciated his condition, their act in sending him out . . . was wrongful and
rendered them liable in damages.”).
82. Id. at 304-05, 111 N.W. at 3. The court seemed to bridge law and morals
by stating, “the law, as well as humanity, required that he be not exposed in his
helpless condition to the merciless elements.” Id. at 304, 111 N.W. at 3.
83. Shaw v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 8, 114 N.W. 85 (1907).
84. Id. at 8-11, 114 N.W. at 85-86.
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85

emergency care to another.
The court held that, under the
circumstances, the rescuer must show a purpose to help relieve the
86
victim at the earliest moment.
2. Development of the Good Samaritan Law
87

Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law was introduced in 1971.
The legislation created an immunity for a person “who in good
faith and in the exercise of reasonable care renders emergency
88
care at the scene of an emergency.”
However, even after the
Good Samaritan law providing immunity to volunteers was enacted,
the Minnesota Supreme Court continued to recognize the necessity
89
of a special relationship in order to give rise to a duty to protect.
Therefore, although they would have immunity for their less-thanreckless acts when rendering aid to another in an emergency,
individuals would not be required to act unless a special relationship
existed to give rise to that duty.
The Good Samaritan statute was subsequently amended in
1983 to create a statutory duty to render reasonable assistance at
90
the scene of an emergency. It would seem this amendment was
passed in an effort to promote assistance at the scenes of
emergencies. By creating a statutory duty to render assistance to
another with no preexisting duty or special relationship, the
legislature effectively countered the holding of Depue that had been
91
judicially recognized for more than seventy years. This statutory
duty, coupled with the statutory immunity for rendering aid at the

85. Id. at 12, 114 N.W. at 86.
86. Id. (“It must be remembered that the proper test is, not what occurs to a
person subsequently, upon mature deliberation, but whether, under the
circumstances, the conductor showed an evident purpose to do what he could, in
good faith, to relieve the sufferer at the earliest moment.”) (emphasis added).
Strikingly, the court used language in the rule that would later be used in the first
version of Minnesota’s Good Samaritan statutes. See Good Samaritan Law, ch. 218,
1971 Minn. Laws 425 (1971) (noting the actor’s good faith intent).
87. MINN. STAT. § 604.05 (1971) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604A.01
(2002)).
88. Id.
89. See Regan v. Stromberg, 285 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. 1979) (holding as a
correct summary of the law a jury instruction that states “where one . . . takes
charge of another . . . then the person in charge must use reasonable care to
prevent [harm]”).
90. MINN. STAT. § 604.05, subd. 1 (1983).
91. Compare § 604.05, subd. 1 with Depue v. Flateau , 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W.
1 (1907) and Regan v. Stromberg, 285 N.W.2d 97 (Minn. 1979).
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92

scene of an emergency, is essentially how the statute stands today.
The supreme court had the opportunity to analyze the Good
93
Samaritan law in Tiedeman v. Morgan. The facts of Tiedeman are
94
Tiedeman, the boyfriend of the
similar to those of Depue.
defendants’ daughter, was at the defendants’ house watching
95
movies one evening. The defendants were aware that Tiedeman
96
had heart ailments and that he had undergone heart surgery.
While watching movies with the defendants’ daughter, Tiedeman
97
became ill, prompting his girlfriend to call 911.
Defendants
98
cancelled that call for help, claiming Tiedeman said he was fine.
Defendants alleged Tiedeman refused a second offer to go to the
99
hospital. Twenty minutes later, Tiedeman’s girlfriend screamed
100
for help because Tiedeman’s condition worsened. An ambulance
was summoned, but Tiedeman had suffered severe and irreparable
101
brain damage due to lack of oxygen. The injury could have been
102
avoided with earlier treatment.
92. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2002). The pertinent subdivisions now read:
Subdivision 1. Duty to assist. A person at the scene of an emergency
who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave
physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without
danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the
exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel.
A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
Subd. 2. General immunity from liability. (a) A person who, without
compensation or the expectation of compensation, renders emergency
care, advice, or assistance at the scene of an emergency or during
transit to a location where professional medical care can be rendered,
is not liable for any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by that
person in rendering the emergency care, advice, or assistance, unless
the person acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in providing
the care, advice, or assistance. This subdivision does not apply to a
person rendering emergency care, advice, or assistance during the
course of regular employment, and receiving compensation or
expecting to receive compensation for rendering the care, advice, or
assistance.
§ 604A.01, subd. (1)-(2).
93. 435 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
94. See id.
95. Id. at 87.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Tiedeman sued the defendants, claiming they negligently
103
attended to him or interfered with efforts to assist him. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that
“they were entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan statute,
and that the evidence did not support an exception to such
104
immunity for wanton or reckless rendering of care.”
The
appellate court recognized the Good Samaritan law, but found it
105
The Tiedeman court relied on Depue in
inapplicable in this case.
its analysis to establish that defendants had a preexisting legal duty
106
to Tiedeman.
The court continued by saying that, although it
recognized the immunity provision of the Good Samaritan law,
“[n]evertheless, it is evident that the rendering of care which is
addressed by the statute is that course of conduct which has not
107
historically involved a recognized legal duty.”
Consequently, the
lower court’s decision, which rested upon the immunity provided
108
by the Good Samaritan statute, was reversed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals further clarified the role of
the Good Samaritan law in Johnson v. Thompson Motors of Wykoff,
109
Inc.
The plaintiff in Johnson alleged the defendant business was
negligent in not protecting him from the violence of a recently
110
fired employee. The district court relied on the Good Samaritan
law to find the defendant guilty of not providing reasonable
111
The appellate court
assistance at the scene of an emergency.
reversed the decision, noting that the plaintiff’s claim was not for
failure to render reasonable assistance, but for failure to warn
112
customers in advance.
The court thereby focused the Good
Samaritan law’s application to present or existing emergencies, not
113
future emergencies.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 88.
106. Id. at 88-89.
107. Id. at 89.
108. Id.
109. No. C1-99-666, 2000 WL 136076 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2000).
110. Id. at *1. The plaintiff was a customer at defendant’s business.
111. Id. at *2. The former employee, Dan Copeman, returned to Thompson
Motors with a gun, and shot and killed Van Johnson. Id. at *1.
112. Id. at *2.
113. See id. (“Thompson Motors had no statutory duty to render ‘assistance’
before Johnson was shot.”) (emphasis added).
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III. CASE DESCRIPTION
A recent challenge to Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law
occurred in Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2002).
A. Facts
Kelly Swenson, thirteen years old, injured her leg in a
114
snowmobile accident near a highway. Swenson’s sister and three
115
friends were with her. Lillian Tiegs drove by the scene, stopping
116
Discovering
her van when the group signaled her for help.
Swenson’s injury, Tiegs tried to call 911 on her cell phone, but the
117
phone was inoperable.
Tiegs agreed to drive Swenson to the
118
hospital. However, Tiegs decided to first drive back to her house,
less than a quarter of a mile away from the accident, allowing the
rest of Swenson’s group to park their snowmobiles on Tiegs’
119
property and accompany Swenson to the hospital.
Once Swenson was placed in Tiegs’ van, Tiegs attempted to
make a U-turn from the westbound side of the highway to the
120
eastbound side. During the maneuver a tractor-trailer exceeding
121
the speed limit struck the passenger side of Tiegs’ van. Swenson
122
died as a result of the injuries sustained in the crash.
B. The District Court’s Analysis
Swenson’s family brought a wrongful-death action against both
123
The family settled with the truck
the truck driver and Tiegs.
124
driver and proceeded to bring an underinsured-motorist claim
125
The insurer moved for
against Waseca Mutual, Tiegs’ insurer.
114. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 795 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 795-96.
118. Id. at 796.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The purpose of underinsured motorist statutes is to “provide
insurance protection to the insured against damages caused by a negligent
motorist as if the motorist had another liability policy in the amount of the
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summary judgment, claiming that Tiegs was immune from liability
126
The district court
under Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law.
granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the Good
Samaritan law does not require the injured person to be in “grave
127
physical harm.”
The court also concluded that Tiegs had
otherwise satisfied the statutory requirements and was entitled to
128
immunity.
C. The Appellate Court’s Analysis
1. Is Driving an Injured Person from the Scene of an Accident to
a Health-Care Facility Protected Under the Good Samaritan
Statute?
The Minnesota Court of Appeals faced two issues of first
129
The court first had to determine whether the Good
impression.
Samaritan law provides immunity from a negligence claim where a
layperson attempts to transport an injured person from the scene
130
of an accident to a health-care facility.
Emphasis was placed
upon construing the statute in the manner intended by the
131
132
legislature and not creating a judicial construction.
underinsured policy.” 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 37 (2003). It is in the
public interest to give one injured in an auto accident access to insurance
protection to compensate for damages that would have been recoverable if the
underinsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of liability insurance.
Id. Once an insured sustains injuries in a motor vehicle accident with an
underinsured motorist, the insured can recover damages from her own insurer.
See id. § 311. Minnesota requires motor vehicle owners to maintain underinsured
motorist coverage. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(2) (2002). Because Swenson
was occupying Tiegs’ vehicle at the time of the accident, Swenson’s limit of liability
was the limit specified for Tiegs’ vehicle. See § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5). See generally
MICHAEL K. STEENSON, MINNESOTA NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § 15.09 (3d
ed. 2002) (explaining how an injured person must proceed with a claim against an
underinsured motorist).
126. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 796.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 796-97. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2002) (requiring courts to
look to the language of the statute to determine its meaning and “ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature”); Occhino v. Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 360
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that substantive policy concerns and legislative
intent must be examined in order to determine the meaning of a statute).
132. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co, 653 N.W.2d 794, 797 (citing Occhino v.
Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)) (“If the meaning of a statute
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Swenson’s family argued that the “during transit” portion of
the Good Samaritan law protects only those who provide
emergency care while the injured person is being transported to a
health-care facility, not to those merely driving the vehicle that
133
carries the person. The court recognized that the purpose of the
statute is to encourage laypersons to help others in need even when
134
no legal duty to do so exists.
In addition to looking to other
135
the court reasoned that the
states’ analysis for guidance,
proffered construction was too narrow and offered little protection
136
to laypersons.
Because the alternative contradicted the purpose
of the statute, the court concluded that the “during transit”
provision provides immunity to “laypersons whose only act of
assistance is to drive a person from the scene of an emergency to a
137
health-care facility.”
Therefore, the court found Tiegs was
138
protected by the Good Samaritan law.
2. Is It an “Emergency” If the Actor Providing Transportation to
a Health-Care Facility Makes a Brief Stop on the Way?
Swenson’s family also argued that Tiegs did not face an
emergency as required by the Good Samaritan law because she did
not plan to go directly from the scene of the accident to a
139
hospital.
The family also implied that because a life-threatening
140
injury did not exist, there was no emergency.
The court acknowledged that “emergency” had not been
defined by statute or case law in the context of the Good Samaritan

is plain and unambiguous on its face, judicial construction is neither necessary nor
proper.”).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 798. The court observed the treatment of the Good Samaritan law
under similar circumstances in Washington, see Youngblood v. Schireman, 765
P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Massachusetts, see Campbell v. Schwartz, 712
N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999); and New Mexico, see Dahl v. Turner, 458 P.2d
816 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969). Id.
136. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 799. Because professional emergency technicians
are not protected by the Good Samaritan law while on the job due to their
preexisting duty to provide care, the argument provided by Swenson’s family
would protect only laypersons providing emergency care in a vehicle in transit to a
health care facility while a third person drives. Id. at 798-99.
137. Id. at 799.
138. Id. at 800.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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141

law.
However, case law broadly defines an “emergency” as “any
event or occasional combination of circumstances which calls for
142
immediate action or remedy.” The court declared “coming upon
a roadside personal-injury-accident scene is the epitome of an
143
emergency.” The court thus followed the lead of other states that
144
have defined an “emergency.”
The court concluded that,
because Swenson was in a great deal of pain and needed immediate
145
medical assistance, Tiegs was at the scene of an emergency.
When deciding whether the victim must be suffering from
grave or life-threatening injuries, the court looked to the language
146
of the clause granting immunity.
The statute does not require
such injuries; it requires only that a person render assistance at the
147
scene of an emergency.
In addition, the argument posed by
Swenson’s family would require laypersons to determine the
148
severity of a victim’s injuries before offering assistance.
Furthermore, the argument ignores the probability that less serious
149
The court
injuries, left untreated, may become more serious.
then found that when Tiegs came upon the scene she had no way
of knowing the extent of Swenson’s injuries, she could not contact
150
help, and immediate action was necessary.
Concluding that the
slight delay from the planned indirect route to the hospital did not
lessen the emergency, the court found Tiegs’ actions were
151
protected by the Good Samaritan law.

141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Gust v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 486 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 799-800. The court observed the definitions of “emergency” as laid
out by cases in Utah, see Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524, 1530 (10th Cir.
1990); Washington, see Youngblood v. Schireman, 765 P.2d 1312, 1319 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1988); and Illinois, see Rivera v. Arana, 749 N.E.2d 434, 442 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001). Id.
145. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 800.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. To further its rejection of the argument, the court noted that the
likelihood of more serious injuries would increase under such an interpretation.
Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Required Definitions
Before analyzing the Swenson court’s decision on Minnesota’s
Good Samaritan law, it is necessary to have definitions of the
important terms involved: namely, what is an “emergency” and
what is a “Good Samaritan?” The term “emergency” may have
three different meanings, depending on the source consulted.
According to common usage, an emergency is “[a] sudden, urgent,
usually unexpected occurrence or occasion requiring immediate
action; a state, especially of need for help or relief, created by some
152
unexpected event.”
A legal dictionary defines an emergency as
“[c]onfrontation by sudden peril; . . . a pressing necessity; an
exigency; an event or occasional combination of circumstances
153
calling for immediate action.” Minnesota case law has recognized
an emergency as “a situation which has suddenly and unexpectedly
154
arisen and which requires speedy action.” The element common
to all three definitions is a suddenness or unexpectedness to the
situation. The other required information is a definition of a Good
Samaritan. A Good Samaritan is an individual who, out of the
kindness in his heart, assists others who are downtrodden or
155
injured.
Applying these basic definitions to Minnesota’s Good
Samaritan law (which requires individuals to assist at the scene of
an emergency), it seems counterintuitive to force someone, out of
the goodness in his heart, to help another in danger. Perhaps that
is why the overwhelming majority of the states has elected to forgo
legislation requiring individuals to act at the scene of an
156
emergency; forced volunteerism is not logical, and it may not be
in the public’s best interest.
B. Liberal vs. Narrow Interpretation of the Statute
The next step of the analysis is to look at how Minnesota courts
152. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 636 (2d ed. 2001).
153. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (3d ed. 1969).
154. Gust v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 486 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
155. See supra notes 4, 49 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Forty-seven states do not have a
statutory clause creating a duty to assist. Id.
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typically handle “duty” issues. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp. is a
good example of how the Minnesota Supreme Court handled a
question of duty. Funchess involved a question of a landlord’s duty
to protect an apartment tenant from a criminal attack by a third
158
party. Although Funchess is distinguishable from Swenson because
Funchess involved parties to a more business-like transaction, the
159
focus of the court’s analysis on the question of “duty” is on point.
After restating the general common law rule of no duty to aid or
protect, and citing the exceptions of special relationships, the court
ultimately concluded that “whether a special relationship and its
160
The court added,
concomitant duty exists is a question of policy.”
however, “[w]e are generally cautious and reluctant to impose a
duty to protect between those conducting business with one
161
another.”
Analyzing the Swenson decision through the lens of Funchess
brings a question to mind: How should the court construe the
Good Samaritan statute?
By broadly construing the Good
Samaritan immunity, the court may indirectly broaden the
associated duty to render assistance. The court may find it easier to
conclude that the duty to assist existed if the potential rescuer was
largely protected. In other words, the court may reason that the
more one is protected from liability for his acts, the more willing
the court should be to make him act by imposing a duty.
It seems, therefore, the court can choose only one of two
162
paths: follow the judicial trend and be “cautious and reluctant” to
impose a duty by narrowly construing the Good Samaritan
immunity, or follow the apparent legislative purpose behind the
163
statute and construe the immunity broadly. The Swenson court
seemingly followed the legislative purpose of the law’s enactment
and broadly construed the immunity of Minnesota’s Good
164
Samaritan statute.
The reason for this seems clear and
157. 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001).
158. See id. at 671.
159. See id. at 673.
160. Id. (emphasis added). The court went on to state that “[f]urther, we must
consider the relative costs and benefits of imposing a duty.” Id. at n.4.
161. Id. at 674.
162. Id.
163. See Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002); Veilleux, supra note 41.
164. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 799-800 (holding that emergency care rendered
“during transit” includes the mere act of driving an injured person to a medical
location, and that since the statute does not require a certain severity of injury,
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appropriate: Funchess involved a situation between parties
unaffected by statute, requiring only judicial interpretation of any
special relationship involved, while Swenson involved a situation
potentially falling within the bounds of a statute. The Swenson
court noted that, once a case falls within a statute, “[t]he canons of
construction also demand that substantive policy concerns and
legislative intent be examined in order to determine the meaning of
165
the statute.”
Consequently, the court was not at liberty to
construe the Good Samaritan statute in a way preferred by the
court, but was required to construe it in the manner that would
give it the effect intended by the legislature.
C. An Easier Method of Resolving the Dispute
The appellate court made resolution of the dispute in Swenson
more difficult than necessary. The court seemed to be sidetracked
by Swenson’s argument that the “during transit” provision of the
Good Samaritan statute applies only to care rendered beyond the
mere act of driving, thereby implying that the care rendered must
166
be medical in nature.
The court then focused on the “during
transit” provision of the statute, comparing the relative duties of
medical technicians and non-emergency personnel, as well as
167
restating the policy behind the statute.
The dispute could have been resolved in Tiegs’ favor with far
more ease simply by analyzing the elements required for Good
Samaritan immunity, defining a required term, and comparing that
information to the facts of the case. To begin, in addition to
receiving no compensation and not acting in a reckless manner, an
actor at the scene of an emergency is granted immunity for
168
“render[ing] emergency care, advice, or assistance.”
The most
basic of the three elements is “assistance.” “Assistance” is defined as
169
“help; aid; support.” If this most basic element is met, along with
the other statutory requirements for immunity, the analysis need
not go any further.
Therefore, under this analysis, the court could have simply
care for any injury will suffice as long as it is at the scene of an emergency).
165. Id. at 797 (emphasis added) (citing Occhino v. Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357,
360 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)).
166. See id. at 798.
167. Id. at 798-99.
168. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2 (2002) (emphasis added).
169. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 126 (2d ed. 2001).
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asked: did Tiegs render emergency assistance? The answer must be
yes. Once she saw the girls signaling her for help for the injured
170
Swenson, Tiegs had come upon an unexpected situation that
171
She provided
required her speedy or immediate action.
emergency assistance by helping Swenson get to a medical facility.
Whether Tiegs gave Swenson medical assistance is irrelevant; the
statute only requires that an actor who seeks to be protected render
172
emergency assistance.
D. Interpretation of the Good Samaritan Law in Other States
Because Swenson brought to light two issues of first impression
for the Minnesota Court of Appeals, it is helpful to observe the
treatment of the Good Samaritan law in other states. However, it is
critical to note that the treatment of the statute regarding a case in
one state will not be the “holy grail” for another state with a
factually similar case. The difficulty with comparing such cases
among states arises because of differences in the states’ Good
173
Samaritan statutes.
It has been noted that decisions in Good
174
Samaritan cases turn upon the wording of the statute.
Consequently, other states’ decisions provide only guidance, not
answers.
1. Decisions Favoring Good Samaritan Immunity
Other states’ courts have reached decisions that speak to the
170. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 795.
171. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
172. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2 (2002). This implication is clear
because the statute later refers to a “location where professional medical care can
be rendered.” § 604A.01, subd. 2. (emphasis added). Had the legislature
intended to require that the only protected Good Samaritan acts would be
medical care, the same terminology would be used throughout the statute. The
distinction justifies the inference that protected Good Samaritan acts need not be
medical in nature. An example distinguishing emergency assistance from medical
assistance might start with a person in a burning car. One who pulls the victim
from the car would be rendering emergency assistance, while one who tends to the
victim’s wounds would be rendering medical assistance. Either form of assistance
would justify granting immunity under the Good Samaritan statute assuming all
other requirements are satisfied.
173. See supra Part II.C. For example, the different language used in various
Good Samaritan statutes gives rise to different areas in which the statute applies
and different classes of individuals protected by immunity. See generally Veilleux,
supra note 41.
174. See McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666, 672 (N.D. 2001) (“[T]hose
decisions are necessarily dependent upon the terminology of a specific statute.”).
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issue of whether Tiegs was entitled to immunity for merely driving
Swenson to the hospital. A North Dakota case shows how easy it
can be for a court to grant immunity to a volunteer at an accident
175
site when public policy dictates as much. In McDowell v. Gillie the
court had to determine whether the act of stopping at the scene of
a winter accident to inquire whether any assistance was needed
could constitute rendering aid or assistance under the Good
176
The North Dakota Supreme Court broadly
Samaritan Act.
177
defined the term “render” as “[t]o give or make available.”
The
court also consulted the broad statutory definition of “aid or
assistance,” finding that it meant “any actions which the aider
reasonably believed were required to prevent [injury to the
178
victim].”
Consequently, the court concluded, “the act of
stopping at the scene of an accident and inquiring whether any
assistance is needed can constitute the rendering of aid and
179
assistance.”
While Minnesota’s Good Samaritan statute does not include
180
such a broad definition of what constitutes “aid or assistance,”
had the Swenson court used the definition of “render” used by the
McDowell court, Tiegs would have been granted immunity with
relative ease. Tiegs certainly “made available” her assistance
because, unlike the defendants in McDowell who merely stopped at
the scene of an accident to assess the situation, Tiegs offered to
181
give the injured Swenson a ride to the hospital.
182
Flynn v. United States came to the same conclusion as the
court in McDowell. Park employees approached an accident scene
183
and put on their vehicle’s lights and sirens. The court found the
employees had rendered aid or assistance pursuant to the Good
184
The Flynn court liberally applied the statute
Samaritan statute.
because it held that stopping at the scene of an accident without
rendering actual physical assistance can constitute rendering

175. Id. at 671.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-01(1) (2001)).
179. Id. at 674.
180. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2002).
181. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
182. Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1990).
183. Id. at 1526.
184. Id. at 1530.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 10
NOWLIN-FINAL.DOC

1024

3/30/2004 10:26 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

185

emergency care.
The Washington Court of Appeals offers guidance on treating
the issue of whether a brief stop or delay negates the immunity that
would otherwise be provided to someone under the Good
186
Samaritan law.
In Youngblood v. Schireman the court dealt with a
young woman, Youngblood, who was assaulted by her boyfriend in
187
his parents’ house. His parents gave her a washcloth to clean her
injuries, and spent the next thirty minutes trying to calm down
188
their son.
Youngblood claimed that her boyfriend’s parents’
conduct was grossly negligent or willful or wanton misconduct, and
they should therefore not be entitled to immunity under
189
Washington’s Good Samaritan statute.
The court defined the
unprotected conduct as:
[D]o[ing] an act or intentionally fail[ing] to do an act . . .
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would
lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct
creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another,
but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which
190
is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Like Washington’s statute, Minnesota’s Good Samaritan law
does not protect acts done in a “willful and wanton or reckless
191
manner.” The Swenson court could have granted Tiegs immunity
because, using the analysis set forth in Youngblood, there was no
showing that, in transporting Swenson, Tiegs “intentionally delayed
taking her to the hospital in reckless disregard of the consequences
in circumstances in which a reasonable man would have had reason
to know that such a delay would, to a high degree of probability,
192
result in substantial harm to [Swenson].”
Finally, a case from Alaska that helps guide courts on the
general policy issues accompanying the interpretation of Good
193
Samaritan statutes is Lee v. State.
The reasoning in Lee makes it
easier for other courts to broadly construe such statutes and protect
individuals without a preexisting duty because “[a] rescuer under a
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id.
See Youngblood v. Schireman, 765 P.2d 1312 (Wash. 1988).
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1319-20.
See id. at 1319.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965)).
MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 2 (2002).
Youngblood, 765 P.2d at 1320.
Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1971).
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preexisting duty to rescue would not need the added inducement
194
This reasoning
of immunity . . . for his ordinary negligence.”
justifies a broad interpretation of Minnesota’s Good Samaritan
statute to grant Tiegs immunity because she had no preexisting
duty to rescue or aid, and should therefore be protected for policy
reasons.
2. Decisions Restricting Good Samaritan Immunity
Other states have narrowly construed their Good Samaritan
statutes, restricting the immunity the statute offers. One such
195
The issue presented in Dahl is
example is Dahl v. Turner.
identical to that of Swenson: does the act of transporting another
196
constitute “rendering care?”
The Dahl court held that
197
The
transporting another did not constitute “rendering care.”
two cases, however, are factually distinguishable.
In Dahl the defendant, Mrs. Turner, came upon the scene of
198
199
an accident.
The plaintiff, Mr. Dahl, had wrecked his car.
Other than a cut on his arm, Dahl appeared perfectly normal and
200
otherwise uninjured.
He did not want to go to a doctor, but
201
Turner
rather to a motel in a nearby city to see a friend.
202
happened to be going to the same city.
With Dahl in her car,
Turner was subsequently involved in an auto accident of her own,
203
He sued Turner for
in which Dahl received further injuries.
those injuries, and Turner claimed immunity under New Mexico’s
204
Good Samaritan statute.
The court held that “[i]f Mrs. Turner
was administering ‘care’ in providing transportation to plaintiff,
such care was not emergency care within the meaning of the
statute. There are no facts indicating a pressing necessity for such
transportation; no facts indicating that the transportation was
205
immediately called for.”
194. Id. at 1209 n.7.
195. Dahl v. Turner, 458 P.2d 816 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).
196. See id. at 824; Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 796
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
197. See Dahl, 458 P.2d at 824.
198. Id. at 823.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 818, 823.
205. Id. at 824.
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Clearly the events in Swenson would indicate a “pressing
206
Perhaps the New Mexico
necessity” to any passing motorist.
Court of Appeals would have held differently had Dahl’s injuries
been more severe, or if Turner would have provided transportation
to a place other than a destination to which she also happened to
be traveling. Nonetheless, the Dahl decision is an example of
denying Good Samaritan immunity to an actor in a situation where
207
another court probably would have granted the immunity.
Two other cases show a narrow interpretation of the applicable
Good Samaritan statute. In Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. the Nevada
Supreme Court strictly read the statute as applying only to those
208
who render emergency care to injured persons.
The defendant
in Buck was driving his truck at night when he came upon a stalled
209
car in the middle of the highway. He offered to assist the women
in the car by alerting other drivers to their presence with his
210
headlights. The driver of an approaching bus did not realize the
women’s car was in the middle of the road. The bus struck the
211
women’s car, injuring the occupants.
The court denied the
defendant’s claim of Good Samaritan immunity because the
212
This
women were uninjured at the time he offered assistance.
holding is also far more restrictive than decisions that grant
immunity to those who merely ask whether any assistance is
213
214
needed or turn on safety lights at the scene of an emergency.
Finally, in Howell v. City Towing Associates, Inc. a call for help did
215
not satisfy the requirement of rendering emergency care.
The
defendant tow truck driver gave the elderly plaintiff a ride home
216
after the plaintiff had been involved in a car accident.
Shortly
217
The
after the ride began, the plaintiff went into cardiac arrest.

206. See Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 800 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002) (noting that Tiegs came across the accident scene not long after it occurred,
discovering the victim in a great deal of pain and needing medical assistance).
207. Contra McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 2001).
208. Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437, 441 (Nev. 1989).
209. Id. at 439.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 441.
213. See McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 2001).
214. See Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1990).
215. Howell v. City Towing Assocs., Inc., 717 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986).
216. Id. at 729.
217. Id.
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driver called his dispatcher for assistance, and the dispatcher then
218
Without much analysis, the
contacted emergency personnel.
court simply laid out its reasoning by stating “[w]e can find no basis
in law for a determination that a person who calls his dispatcher to
notify EMS is performing emergency care as contemplated by the Good
219
Samaritan statute.”
Perhaps the court would have decided
differently had the driver contacted medical personnel directly,
rather than through his dispatcher. This decision is not aligned
with Minnesota law, however, because Minnesota’s Good Samaritan
statute specifically defines reasonable assistance as “obtaining or
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical
220
personnel.”
E. The Role of Policy Concerns
Because the states’ Good Samaritan statutes are not identical,
the decision in one state will not necessarily translate into an
appropriate decision in another state. Consequently, one must
ultimately determine the policy interests to be satisfied when
choosing an out-of-state decision to follow.
The area of Good Samaritan law is very much a policy-driven
area because it goes against decades of case law that does not
221
These statutes take
recognize any duty to assist in emergencies.
on the difficult task of regulating common sense. For example,
North Dakota’s Good Samaritan statute provides immunity for “aid
222
or assistance necessary or helpful in the circumstances.”
The
statute proceeds to define “aid or assistance necessary or helpful in
the circumstances” as any actions the aider reasonably believed
were required to prevent injury depending upon the aider’s
223
perception. One burden that may flow from this type of legislation
is the evidentiary issue of determining how the actor perceived the
situation, and then determining what actions the actor reasonably
believed were necessary to prevent injury.
If the policy behind Good Samaritan statutes is to encourage

218. Id.
219. Id. at 731.
220. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subd. 1 (2002).
221. Compare § 604A.01 (2002) with Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W.
1 (1907).
222. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.1-02 (2001).
223. § 32-03.1-01.
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224

those without a preexisting duty to help to come to another’s aid,
then Minnesota courts must address certain issues. First, courts
should stress the importance of the reasonableness standard set
225
forth in the Good Samaritan statute.
By granting immunity to
individuals who act merely by contacting law enforcement or
226
medical professionals, the courts can encourage others to assist in
some way, even if they do so with a less-than-heroic act.
The Swenson court took a step in the right direction by finding
that transporting an injured person to a hospital constituted
227
rendering assistance pursuant to the Good Samaritan statute.
This decision operates to decrease the time between the moment
an injury is sustained in an accident and the time when
professionals can tend to the injury; a passer-by who sees the victim
can transport him to a hospital in less time than would be required
to wait for an emergency vehicle to arrive at the scene and then
proceed to transport the victim to a hospital. Continuing to hold
as such may encourage more individuals to act at the scenes of
emergencies.
F. An Unanswered Question
The Swenson court left a question unanswered in its analysis of
the requirements for Good Samaritan immunity. What if the actor
does not try to call 911 first in an effort to get professional medical
care to the scene of the emergency but instead transports the
victim to the hospital? This seemed like an important piece of
information to the Swenson court because the decision twice
228
mentions Tiegs’ attempt to call 911.
However, the court
conducted no analysis regarding whether such conduct was
necessary to grant immunity to a volunteer at an emergency.
The answer would seem to require an actor to try to contact
medical or law enforcement professionals in all situations if it can
be done so with relative ease. The Swenson court seemed to imply
224. See Veilleux, supra note 41.
225. § 604A.01, subd. 1 (2002).
226. § 604A.01, subd. 1.
227. Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002). Although Minnesota’s Good Samaritan statute does not clearly include
transportation of a victim as a protected act, several other states do include such
an express provision. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 613.17 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2793 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37(1) (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.300(1) (West 2003).
228. Swenson, 653 N.W.2d at 796, 800.
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this with its repeated references to Tiegs’ attempt to contact
229
This notion is also consistent with the
emergency personnel.
statutory requirement that the actor “give reasonable assistance to
230
the exposed person.”
The fact that an actor does not have
immediate access to a phone need not preclude granting immunity
to such actor. However, if a phone line is available, it seems a call
should be placed even if only to alert the professionals that the
actor and victim are en route to the location where further
professional aid can be rendered.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Minnesota Good Samaritan statute opposes a
decades-old and commonly-accepted rule that does not require one
231
to aid or assist an individual in danger, it is a legislative decision
to eliminate or retain the duty to assist. The Swenson court was
required to analyze the existing statute, and correctly decided two
issues of first impression: first, that Good Samaritan immunity
should be granted to an actor who merely transports a victim to a
health care facility; and second, that a brief stop along the way to
such facility does not negate the seriousness of that emergency.
Public policy favors a broad interpretation of the immunity
statute to encourage individuals to act at the scene of an emergency
even if only by contacting professionals or driving the victim to a
health care facility. Such acts will allow medical professionals to
tend to the victim’s wounds more quickly. By continuing to
broadly construe the immunity granted by Minnesota’s Good
Samaritan statute, individuals will, in time, be more apt to respond
at the scenes of emergencies without fear of suffering legal
repercussions for any injuries the victim may suffer due to the
actor’s negligence.

229. Id. Apparently the only reason Tiegs decided to take Swenson to the
hospital instead of allowing an emergency vehicle to transport her was Tiegs’
inability to raise a signal on her cell phone. Id. at 796.
230. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subd. 1 (2002). The statute also defines
reasonable assistance as including the act of “obtaining or attempting to obtain aid
from law enforcement or medical personnel.” Id.
231. See supra Parts II.B, II.D.1-2.
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